The War on Terror lives on today only as political theater. Policymakers, from President Obama to Members of Congress, continue to fear the accusation of being "soft on terror," and hence continue to describe contemporary counterterrorism efforts in martial terms. Congress continues to legislate War on Terror approaches that the security establishment, for the most part, hasn't asked for and, in some cases, has even explicitly rejected.

But while the political class remains stuck in the past, the security establishment has moved on. Virtually all of the progress that U.S. authorities have made in dismantling al Qaeda and countering terrorism has been accomplished in spite of, not because of the War on Terror. As we consider the future of U.S. counterterrorism after Bin Laden, we would do well to consider what we have learned from the evolving security response to the 9/11 attacks, and how those lessons might keep us safer in a world where the War on Terror may be over but the threat of terrorism still remains.

Read our whole piece at The Atlantic.

In an op-ed published in ROLL CALL, 'The Newspaper of Capitol Hill,' Breakthrough asks: "What is the purpose of Congress’ oversight role if not to evaluate (and regulate as necessary) such controversial and consequential executive activities?"

"Congress ... has done little to promote the kind of sustained and systematic inquiry into the effectiveness of counterterrorism practices that could not only settle questions about EITs but also improve our ability to combat terrorism more generally."

"As the debate over enhanced interrogation techniques has proved, too little about what works in counterterrorism is settled knowledge — in or out of government."

"Congress is the only entity with the constitutional authority and the wherewithal to really change that fact."

"With the Arab Spring and the death of bin Laden likely altering the future shape of the threat posed by terrorists, now is a particularly opportune time to expand our capacity to clearly and methodically evaluate the challenges we are up against and how best we can face them down."

To read the full op-ed, click here.

Readers take note: Berkeley sociologists, and our good friends, Ryan Calder and Brian Lande are displaying their usual intestinal fortitude and zest for adventure in two parts of the world that are both dangerous and incredibly interesting research sites: Libya and Afghanistan, respectively.

Check out Ryan Calder's informative, entertaining, and often breathless accounts of events on the ground in Benghazi and elsewhere in Libya at http://revolutionology.wordpress.com/

Catch sociologist/cop/soldier Brian Lande's phenomenological musings about life on an Afghan forward operating base at http://brianlande.com/

Both blogs bring readers into a world few experience, and offer analysis and explanations of those worlds that virtually no one else (in media or as troops on the ground) can so capably elucidate. Enjoy!

As the nation's new suspicious activity reporting fusion centers come online this year, observers are beginning to notice a major problem: there is a significant gap between the demand for and supply of experts able to train local police officers who will be charged with the difficult task of sniffing out terror suspects in their communities.

Unmet demand means lucrative teaching and training appointments for those who are able to fashion themselves as CT experts. But it also seems to mean that local police forces are taking what they can get in terms of tutelage, even if the curricula on offer are inaccurate or unhelpful.

According to an NPR story, Army Lt. Col. Reid Sawyer, a career intelligence officer who heads the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, "has been watching with alarm the phenomenon of officials with limited experience selling themselves as terrorism instructors."

"You've got a lot of individuals who are not academically qualified to be instructing in these venues, and more importantly they are speaking with authority, which empowers the audience with knowledge that is not necessarily accurate," said Sawyer, adding that these short courses tend to stereotype Muslims in a way that just isn't helpful as officials redouble their efforts to fight homegrown terrorism and radical Islam."

A more detailed interview study by Meg Stalcup and Joshua Craze, published in the Washington Monthly, highlights the mentality of some of the (mostly) men making the rounds training local law enforcement. For instance, "the trainer Joe Bierly, based in Riverside County, California … doesn’t think American law enforcement is ready for the next terrorist attack. At the end of the day, he said, the question is this: 'Can you run fifteen yards on a blood-slicked floor, take aim, and still hit the target?'”

"Richard Hughbank, another counterterrorism trainer, is a fourth-generation combat veteran on his father’s side. 'Honestly, I kinda fell into it,' Hughbank told [Stalcup and Craze] when [they] interviewed him in November 2009.'“I think most of us did.'”

Another self-made CT trainer, John Giduck writes, “'I think the first thing we need to do is pass federal legislation exempting law enforcement from any civil or criminal prosecution, any liability at all, for what they do if there is a terrorist attack on U.S. soil.' … 'In attempting to prepare the American psyche for the worst possible terrorist act—the taking and killing of children—we must all shed the veil of civility and luxury in which we conduct our lives.'”

"Despite their different backgrounds, the counterterrorism trainers [Stalcup and Craze] interviewed have a remarkably similar worldview. It is one of

Continue reading "Unqualified, Self-appointed CT Experts Training Local Law Enforcement " »

Lisa Stampnitzky has been studying what she calls the "unruly field" of terrorism studies for the past few years. In an article published in Qualitative Sociology she identifies two poles toward which those in the field gravitate and, perhaps, the birth pangs of a new scientific discipline.

One camp of scholars in terrorism studies, mostly academics from the social sciences, believes that what counts for security knowledge is too often based on unsubstantiated folk knowledge and impressionistic anecdote. The other camp, populated by security experts with close ties to the state, is largely unconcerned with such critiques, probably because they have secure positions influencing state officials and their policies.

Stampnitzky does not attempt to adjudicate between those who see "'terrorism' as a problem to be made coherent by or for academic analysis" and those who "see it as a practical problem to be combated and eradicated." So, perhaps the most interesting question raised by her paper is left unanswered: where is the field going?

As in many areas of human activity, conflict often correlates with productive dynamism and change. Right now, it appears that many rigorous scientists are trying to bring the field out of the secretive chambers of government where it is treated as a craft and into the open light of scientific inquiry. More power to them.