In a beautifully written op-ed, here, David Shipler advances an argument the Breakthrough Institute has been pushing for some time -- that the founding fathers who framed our constitution "handed down a system in which liberty and security were fused, one inseparable from the other," and that the conventional wisdom that the two are at odds is simply belied by a wealth of evidence from history, especially since 9/11.

Citing our report, "Counterterrorism Since 9/11: Evaluating the Efficacy of Controversial Tactics," Shipler also points out that the surveillance regime implemented in the wake of those horrible attacks has contributed in no measurable way to our safety since, though it has eroded a sense of identity and cooperation between the governed and their leaders.

Take a look and pass it along. Americans need to understand the truth that group security and individual liberty improve together, so they can avoid policies that jeopardize both.

Audrey Kurth Cronin is a professor of war and statecraft the U.S. National War College and also continues as a non-residential Senior Research Associate at Oxford. Before that, Dr. Cronin was Specialist in Terrorism at the U.S. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, where she advised Members in the aftermath of 9/11. She has taught at numerous other universities including Columbia, the University of Maryland and Georgetown, where her long-standing graduate course on terrorism was featured in the New York Times shortly after 9/11. In addition to her academic expertise, she has served periodically in the U.S. government, including positions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, and the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. She regularly consults with agencies in both the Executive and Legislative branches. We were pleased to have the opportunity to speak with her two days after the death of Osama bin Laden to clarify the impact of his death.

Audrey Kurth Cronin: Well, first let me state that I’m speaking only for myself, as an academic.

Al Qaeda has many parts, so the term 'al- Qaeda,' is often overly broad, over-used and over-generalized. Every time we use 'al-Qaeda' to refer to this movement as if it were a seamless monolith, we give it more credit than it deserves. It is better to talk about al-Qaeda as being comprised of three levels: al-Qaeda the core, specific al-Qaeda affiliates, and local individuals inspired by the broader movement. The various parts aren't necessarily all working seamlessly with the core and, indeed, sometimes we find they are working at odds.

Beginning with the last, the third level, individuals in small cells or even on their own are responding to messages, images, blogs and chat rooms on internet sites. For them, “al-Qaeda” is more like a social movement, driving them to be inspired and even hatch plots, with sometimes tenuous operational links to the central organization.

At the second level, you have numerous affiliates, some of whom have been associated with al-Qaeda for a long period of time and some of whom are groups with quite distinct local agendas who have only adopted the al-Qaeda “brand” in recent years.

And then we have Al Qaeda central. With heavy military pressure on the core, including the recent campaign of drone attacks, we have seriously weakened the central leadership in the last 2-3 years especially. By killing bin Laden, we have greatly advanced that process by dealing a devastating blow to the core of al- Qaeda.

But you have asked what will happen as a result of “decapitation,” by which I mean the capture or killing of the leader of a group that uses terrorism. It is indeed a long-established way of damaging or ending a group—states often try to eliminate the central inspirational figure. The historical record shows that it works best with certain types of groups. And unfortunately, al-Qaeda does not match all the classic characteristics of those groups. First, groups that have ended by decapitation have generally been hierarchically structured. But, as I have explained, since 9/11 al-Qaeda has evolved through various stages, becoming more horizontal and layered. Second, groups that end through the capture or killing of a leader don't tend to have a clear succession plan. And Osama bin Laden was very careful to designate a successor and plan for the group's survival after him. Third, groups that end through decapitation tend to be younger than other groups. Having existed for at least 20 year, al-Qaeda is not young by the standards of terrorist groups: most struggle to make it beyond the average lifespan of 5-8 years. Finally, groups that end through decapitation have a strong cult of personality attached to their leader. Although bin Laden in his rhetoric insisted that the movement is not about him--that he expected to die and welcomed his own martyrdom, because the movement is much bigger than one person--Osama bin Laden has definitely developed a kind of cult of personality. So, from that perspective especially, this is a serious blow—though one not likely to END al-Qaeda.

Incidentally, looking at local groups and individuals, there's already a lively response to bin Laden’s death on the three to four thousand so-called ‘jihadist’ internet sites, chat rooms and blogs. On the whole, they are insisting that they are still dedicated to the cause and that bin Laden's death will not end of the movement.

AKC: Some of it is. But al-Qaeda the core has not been cutting edge on the use of technology in recent years. al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has been more inventive, and they have their own followers and participants. And they will continue without bin Laden.

Continue reading "Q&A, with Audrey Kurth Cronin " »

by
Guest Writer -- Kuba Wrzesniewski

On the 19th of March, in order to enforce UN Security Council Resolution 1973 mandating the use of force in the protection of civilians against Libyan forces loyal to Muammar Gaddafi, the United States began airstrikes against targets in Libya. This marks the sixth major humanitarian intervention carried out by US forces since the end of the cold war. Once considered a distraction from the core mission of the US military -- the protection of America and American interests from rival powers -- humanitarian interventions have become a major and regular component of US security strategy. This development has been a bipartisan affair. Major interventions in Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo and now Libya were launched by Democratic Presidents, while military force was deployed to Somalia and Iraq by Republicans (though Iraq also suffered airstrikes during the Clinton administration).

Although humanitarian interventions have become an increasingly 'normal' element of US security policy, the conditions that give rise to them tend to be very particular and episodic. Considerations regarding interventions tend to be driven by moral urgency rather than security calculation, with advocates tending to argue from negative cases. Intervention came too late in Bosnia, and didn't come at all in Rwanda, and the result in both cases was genocide. This case was made most eloquently in A Problem from Hell, a study of genocide that propelled it's author, Samantha Power, to the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard and, later, to a post as Special Assistant to President Obama's foreign policy team. A more complete evaluation of the implications of humanitarian interventions should include an examination of all the cases where it was attempted. Such comprehensive study could help inform security thinking about the current Libyan operation.

We cannot offer such a fulsome treatment, here. But we can offer a starting point for the discussion...

Continue reading "Humanitarian Intervention in Libya - Considering the Endgame" »

Readers take note: Berkeley sociologists, and our good friends, Ryan Calder and Brian Lande are displaying their usual intestinal fortitude and zest for adventure in two parts of the world that are both dangerous and incredibly interesting research sites: Libya and Afghanistan, respectively.

Check out Ryan Calder's informative, entertaining, and often breathless accounts of events on the ground in Benghazi and elsewhere in Libya at http://revolutionology.wordpress.com/

Catch sociologist/cop/soldier Brian Lande's phenomenological musings about life on an Afghan forward operating base at http://brianlande.com/

Both blogs bring readers into a world few experience, and offer analysis and explanations of those worlds that virtually no one else (in media or as troops on the ground) can so capably elucidate. Enjoy!