REPORTS

PLANES, TRAINS, and CAR BOMBS
The Method Behind the Madness of Terrorism

Executive Summary

As we marked the ten-year anniversary of 9/11, we also marked the expiration date of countless predictions that other devastating al Qaeda (inspired, financed, or directed) attacks would occur on US soil within a decade of that fateful day. Little more than a week after the atrocities, Attorney General John Ashcroft worried aloud "that terrorist activity against the United States may increase once this country responds to [the] attacks." Ten days later, Democratic Senator Carl Levin told Fox News that "biological and chemical threats ... are real. We ought to put resources there." Republican Representative Chris Shays of Connecticut was more trenchant: "I am absolutely certain that terrorists, if they don't have access to biological weapons now, will; and I am absolutely certain that they will use them. The expertise exists. The potential that it has been shared with a terrorist is almost a no brainer." President Bush pushed the possibility of catastrophe to its logical extreme: "these terrorists ... are seeking chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. Given the means, our enemies would be a threat to every nation and, eventually, to civilization itself."

Such dire predictions were not confined to the political class. Terrorism experts and academics like Walter Laqueur, Jessica Stern, Bruce Hoffman, Mark Juergensmeyer, and many others had seized upon the notion that a "new terrorism" was emerging. Even before 9/11, Laqueur wrote that "yesterday's nuisance has become one of the gravest dangers facing mankind." Many proponents of the "new terrorism" meme became even more emphatic after the attacks, arguing that religiously-inspired terrorism had become divorced from rationality. Laqueur lamented that "until recently, terrorism was, by and large, discriminate, selecting its victims carefully... It was, more often than not, 'propaganda by deed.' Contemporary terrorism has increasingly become indiscriminate in the choice of its victims. Its aim is no longer to conduct propaganda but to effect maximum destruction." Laqueur described the new terrorists as "paranoiac" and driven by "all-consuming," "nonexistent hidden motives" leading to "a loss of the sense of reality." "The outlook," he concluded, "is poor; there are no known cures for fanaticism and paranoia."

With the political and expert classes significantly aligned in their description of insane, religiously fanatical terrorists determined to kill millions with weapons of mass destruction, journalists and the public could do little but wait for the next heavy shoe to drop. As they looked around them, they saw vulnerabilities everywhere. After rumors of the potential for biological or chemical attacks on America's water supply raced through the internet, The New York Times reported on local governments' efforts to secure reservoirs and other sources of drinking water: "Helicopters, patrol boats and armed guards sweep across the watershed feeding New York City, enforcing a temporary ban on fishing, hunting, and hiking. Massachusetts has sealed commuter roads that run atop dams or wind down to the water's edge. And Utah has enlisted the help of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to peer down at reservoirs from planes and satellites, hoping to spot any weak points." By November 1st, USA Today was reporting that "scientists and politicians are growing increasingly worried about another possible target for terrorists: the food supply." Several authors over the years have also flagged America's vulnerability to internet attacks that could significantly disrupt the critical infrastructure upon which our economy depends. In a recent report, Washington's Bipartisan Policy Center recommended that "defending the U.S. against such attacks must be an urgent priority." "This is not science fiction," they wrote, "It is possible to take down cyber systems and trigger cascading disruptions and damage."

Even as our greatest fears have not come to pass, the drive to promote measures eliminating even the impression of risk or threat has hardly lost momentum. Despite the fact that the United States has developed enough vaccine to inoculate its entire population against the two most deadly biological agents that terrorists might conceivably learn to produce someday, The New York Times Magazine recently published a long article suggesting that more should be done -- that billions should be spent developing and stockpiling vaccine for every disease that terrorists could possibly use to harm Americans. Never mind that terrorists have shown no capacity to successfully develop and weaponize any of them.

Despite the perennial warnings about exotic weapons and targets (warnings that, ironically, offer terrorists tantalizing clues about how and where the United States is vulnerable), members and allies of al Qaeda's hirabi (AKA 'jihadi') movement continue to carry out the same sorts of attacks they executed in the decades before 9/11. In 1993, hirabis used a truck bomb in an attempt to topple the World Trade Center, the same tactic they used in 1996 to bomb the Khobar Towers barracks in Saudi Arabia, and in 1998 to bomb US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. In 2000, they used a different vehicle - a small boat - to approach their target when they bombed the USS Cole in the port of Aden, Yemen. A year later, they used different vehicles again, airplanes, to bomb the World Trade Centers and the Pentagon. Months later a hirabi named Richard Reid attempted to bomb a plane itself with a chemical explosive hidden in his shoe. In May 2002, a car bomb killed 14 people at a Karachi hotel frequented by Westerners. In October of that year, another bomb, placed in a Bali nightclub, killed 202 mostly Australian citizens.

In 2004, hirabis detonated ten bombs on four trains in Madrid, killing nearly 200 people. A year later, hirabis attacked three trains and a bus in London. Later in 2005, bombs placed at American hotels in Amman, Jordan killed 57 people. In 2007, British police uncovered a car-bomb plot targeting Glasgow airport. In 2008, a car bomb killed six people and injured dozens more outside Pakistan's Danish Embassy. Al Qaeda claimed the attack was retaliation for an offensive political cartoon. In September 2009, Najibullah Zazi was arrested in the final stages of a plan to replicate the Madrid attacks of 2004 in New York City's subway system. On Christmas Day of the same year, Nigerian Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab attempted and failed to down a passenger plane over Detroit by detonating a chemical bomb concealed under his clothes. The next spring, Faisal Shahzad tried to detonate a car bomb in Times Square, but failed. Months later, in October 2010, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula placed explosive devices in cargo planes, but cooperating international intelligence agencies foiled their plans before they could detonate the bombs. Most recently, Rezwan Ferdaus has been charged with a plot to use remote controlled planes to deliver bombs to the Pentagon. All of these and other al Qaeda directed, financed, or inspired attacks have targeted planes, trains, buses, government and symbolic buildings, and western hotels with bombs (and sometimes assault weapons).

The stark contrast between the hirabi repertoire of targets and tactics and the expansive and expanding concerns of journalists, politicians, experts, and academics begs explanation. We find that the pattern of hirabi attacks is not accidental. It is well-suited to their primary strategy -- one attempting to iteratively grow support for their cause so they can one day gain political power and govern territory. That their goals are likely delusional does not diminish the rationality of their strategy, the tactics they use, or the targets they select, all of which are chosen to manipulate the governments they seek to change and the publics they seek to recruit. Various internal and external constraints on hirabi organizations also limit their capability, and thereby, the range of tactics and strategies they can pursue. This paper explores in depth all of these factors shaping hirabi activity.

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COUNTERTERRORISM SINCE 9/11
Evaluating the Efficacy of Controversial Tactics

Executive Summary:

In the wake of 9/11, the U.S. government employed several new counterterrorism (CT) tactics, some of which aroused a great deal of controversy. The controversial tactics included 'enhanced' interrogation, preventative detention, expanded use of secret surveillance without warrants, ethnic/religious profiling, the collection and mining of domestic data, and the prosecution of terror suspects in military tribunals. While there has been great debate over the morality and legality of these controversial measures, there has been significantly less attention dedicated to evaluating whether the tactics work to prevent terrorism. Even so, people on both sides of the security v. morality/legality debate make assumptions about the efficacy of various CT measures. Here we review multiple literatures to assess the efficacy of controversial CT tactics on their own terms, and evaluate their potential utility within larger state security strategies that depend on intelligence management, informant-recruiting, and maintenance of state legitimacy. We find good evidence that controversial CT tactics may have been counterproductive in several ways: increasing the ratio of informational 'noise' to terrorist 'signal,' undermining the state's legitimacy among potential civilian informants, and legitimizing terrorists' preferred status as 'warriors.' In no case is there credible evidence showing that these controversial CT measures significantly helped catch terrorists or offered other strategic advantages outweighing their disadvantages.

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FAQ

What does your report say?
The main findings of Counterterrorism Since 9/11 are that there is no credible evidence demonstrating the efficacy of controversial counter-terrorism measures and strong evidence that they do not work and in some cases are counter-productive. The most effective measures are also the least controversial.

How did you do this report?
We spent over 18 months reviewing and evaluating the evidence and the best available social science. Our study looked at over 570 evaluations, analyses, reports, articles, investigations and other key documents related to the use of CT tactics. We then evaluated this evidence in light of relevant evidence and theory from the social sciences.

Who are you?
The lead author is Nick Adams, a Ph.D candidate (ABD) in sociology at UC-Berkeley. The co-authors are Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger, Chairman and President of the Breakthrough Institute respectively. Breakthrough Institute is a public policy think tank best known for its work on energy and climate issues. Counterterrorism Since 9/11 is the first of three forthcoming reports by Breakthrough Institute on national security.

How are you defining terrorism and counterterrorism?
We define terrorism as the use of physical violence against non-military human targets with the intention of effecting a psychological reaction in some third party/parties and advancing some policy agenda. Counterterrorism, then, refers to efforts to prevent, block, undermine, or end such terrorist efforts or campaigns.

What are you defining as "controversial counterterrorism measures"?
Enhanced interrogation, preventative detention, expanded use of secret surveillance without warrants, ethnic/religious profiling, the collection and mining of domestic data, and the prosecution of terror suspects in military tribunals.

Why did you write this report?
We wanted to establish a factual basis for policymakers to evaluate U.S. counterterrorism policies.

Wouldn't the 9/11 attacks been prevented had security agencies had the tools they today have at their disposal?
No. None of the controversial tactics were necessary to prevent 9/11, which is also the conclusion of the 9/11 Commission.

What is the evidence these measures are counterproductive?
We find that expanded search and surveillance tools have increased the ratio of informational 'noise' to terrorist 'signal.' Ethnic and religious profiling opens backdoors for terrorists who don't fit stereotypical profiles. Abbreviated due process for terror suspects like preventative detention interrupts investigatory practices capable of yielding much more and better information. Enhanced interrogation techniques produce obstinance and poor information. And military tribunals treat terrorists as the 'warriors' they like to believe they are. To the extent that these policies are targeted at Muslim and Arab Americans, they also degrade relationships that can be important for prevention efforts.

If the controversial tactics in question don't work to prevent terrorism, what does?
All the available credible evidence suggests that citizen informants, foreign intelligence tips, and effective police work have been the keys to disrupting plots since 9/11.

Don't some counter-terrorism and other security officials say that they need these tactics?
Yes, a few security officials have made claims about the efficacy of controversial CT tactics. But they have offered nothing in the way of credible evidence. The most famous example was former Vice President Dick Cheney's claim that the CIA could prove that water-boarding saved lives. But released CIA documents showed the opposite.

What about other officials?
In several Inspector General and Government Accountability Office reports security officials have made highly qualified claims about the efficacy of controversial CT along with admissions that they are unable to offer data or examples clearly supporting them. Since their conclusions contradict so much of the credible evidence, basic social science, and even common sense, we judge those claims as lacking credibility. Given all of this, the burden of proof is on advocates of controversial CT tactics.

What do most security officials believe?
We have seen many security officials reject counter-terrorism tactics in recent years. After using some ethnic and religious profiling shortly after 9/11, many in the FBI and TSA have come to see that form of profiling as a potentially dangerous distraction. Military and FBI leaders have condemned the use of torture, and the CIA has all but renounced enhanced interrogation. Many retired and active Generals, including Gen. David Petraeus, have declared the detentions at Guantanamo Bay a security risk to U.S. troops.

Couldn't there be secret evidence that those tactics work?
We think that would be highly unlikely for several reasons. First, one of the findings of our research is that controversial CT tactics do not work for basic sociological and psychological reasons that are unlikely to change. Second, while CT is often imagined as a shadowy, secretive enterprise, much of how CT functions is known through years of court cases, news coverage, congressional testimony, books by high-ranking government security figures, investigative journalism, extensive leaks and declassifications, and countless government oversight reports. It is improbable that all of the credible evidence for the efficacy of controversial CT is secret and that only the evidence for its inefficacy has become public.

Couldn't some controversial CT tactics have a deterrent effect?
That is highly unlikely for several reasons unique to each tactic. But there is plenty of evidence showing that terrorists do not choose their targets based on the CT tactics of targeted states anyway. The UK, home of ubiquitous surveillance (often in the form of closed circuit television) has certainly seen its share of devastating attacks. Israel, of course, has been a highly popular target despite very aggressive search, surveillance, and profiling policies and a hyper-aware society. And of course, terrorists have operated alongside and within insurgent armies in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan despite the presence of hundreds of thousands of U.S. and NATO troops and intensive human and signals intelligence efforts.

Doesn't racial profiling work in Israel?
No. Some observers attribute the security successes of Ben Gurion International airport (in Israel) and El Al airlines to behavioral profiling rather than to the other multiple layers of security they employ. But to make such claims, observers would have to separate out and measure the effects of profiling policies by themselves, which they have yet to do. However, a recent article in Nature reviewing studies of human efforts to reliably detect 'mal-intent' in others concludes that the techniques are ineffective and unreliable. One of us even knows a person who - for research purposes - has successfully lied to Ben Gurion's airport interrogators multiple times. The conclusion that airport questioners are the key layer of defense appears to be significantly overdrawn.

Might NSA data-mining programs work someday if we give them enough time to develop?
NSA data-mining programs seeking to pick potential terrorists out of the crowd, as "CT Since 9/11" explains, require massive amounts of data so computers can train themselves to distinguish between terrorists and non-terrorists. Unfortunately, the data required for such a project simply do not exist in digital form. There are too few terrorists to create a 'training set' the computer can use to learn about their behavior, and virtually all of their behavioral/transactional data (e.g. their purchases, addresses, email and telephone communications, etc.) are entirely innocuous and functionally identical to that of non-terrorists. The NSA should continue to monitor known terrorist websites, email addresses, and phone lines as it has done for years, but broad information collection and data-mining programs will never bear helpful fruit. Worse, chasing that illusion is only adding to the problem of informational white noise drowning out the signals of terrorist activity.

Preventative detention and 'enhanced interrogation techniques are not even used anymore. Why do you write about them?
Even though these tactics are rarely if ever used anymore, there is still a widespread misunderstanding that they were useful when they were employed. In the wake of any future attack, it will be important for policymakers to know that no matter how urgently and deeply they wish to reduce the threat of follow up attacks, these tactics will not help them in their efforts.

Don't you think that a ticking time bomb scenario could justify torture?
The ticking time bomb scenario is a highly improbably hypothetical scenario that has never come to fruition and almost certainly never will. And even within the confines of this extremely improbable scenario, a tortured terrorist would only need to resist abuse (or send investigators on a goose chase) lasting long enough for the ticking bomb to detonate. There is little reason to believe that reality would play out as the writers of television programs have envisioned it. The available evidence from sociology, psychology, and history suggests that the most reliable interrogation methods avoid adversarial relations. Most experienced interrogators like Stephen Kleinman and Matthew Alexander testify to this.

If there have only been fewer than five military commissions, how can you 'scientifically' claim that they are ineffective? Don't we need more data (i.e. more military trials)?
It is true that little experimental field data exist with which to judge the efficacy of military commissions. However, these are not the only data which may be useful. By identifying the differences between military commissions and their Article III Court counterparts, and analyzing their likely consequences, we may draw conclusions about the relative efficacy of the two trial venues. The key differences relate to the juries used and the optics of the trials for global audiences. (Before 2009, military commissions also would have differed in their allowance of hearsay testimony and testimony produced under physical duress.) Both of the existing differences appear to work to the benefit of terrorists' prestige in military commissions by elevating them to the status of 'warriors' and peers of military officers.